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Inventory management in markets with substituting customers is extremely chal-
lenging, not only for a downstream wholesaler, but also for upstream manufacturers.
Motivated by the structures in the agrochemical market, we analyze the optimal pro-
duction and stocking quantities of a manufacturer and a wholesaler, respectively, in
a two-stage supply chain with upstream competition and vertical information asym-
metries. We characterize a monopolistic wholesaler’s optimal stocking quantities and
show that these quantities are not necessarily monotonic, neither in the available
production quantities nor in the customers’ substitution rates. We further derive
the optimal production quantities of a monopolistic and a competitive manufacturer
when they are incompletely informed about the wholesaler’s stocking quantities. We
find that the introduction of competition may lead to decreasing production quan-
tities for some products. Furthermore, a product’s end-of-season inventories at the
manufacturer which arise due to information asymmetries may decrease even when
initial production levels increase.
Key words: customer substitution; supply chain; asymmetric information; com-
petition; inventory management
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1 Introduction
In recent years, a diverse body of research has focused on how firms should react to customers’
substitution behavior. For firms that directly serve customers, investigations range from strate-
gic assortment planning (Ko¨k and Fisher, 2007; Honhon et al., 2010) over promotion strategies
(Walters, 1991) to optimal stocking decisions (Netessine and Rudi, 2003; Jiang et al., 2011). In
a supply chain setting, only the downstream stage experiences the immediate effects of customer
substitution; however, substitution effects also diffuse across the entire supply chain. This paper
therefore investigates how different stages of a supply chain are affected by customer substi-
tution. In particular, we examine the optimal production and stocking decisions of different
supply chain members under upstream competition and vertical information asymmetries.
We are interested in situations when competition and substitution effects arise simultane-
ously within the supply chain. While competition occurs due to the non-cooperative behavior
of independent firms, substitution emerges from the competitive structures within the set of
available products. Note that competition and substitution are neither inclusive nor exclusive
concepts: Competition without substitution arises if multiple independent firms offer an iden-
tical product (in a supply chain setting, e.g., Cachon, 2001; Adida and DeMiguel, 2011), while
substitution without competition occurs if a monopolistic firm offers non-identical, yet similar
products that serve a common customer base.
In this paper, we concentrate on markets where substitution and competition effects exist
simultaneously. Initially, our work is motivated by the agrochemical market. Agrochemical
manufacturers sell their products through locally monopolistic wholesalers to their customers,
mostly farmers or farmer unions. Substitution in this market arises from customers’ focus on
active ingredients, resulting in low brand loyalty. In consequence, stock-outs at the wholesaler
lead to high substitution rates among products. This effect is even further enhanced by the in-
herent finiteness of the selling season for agrochemicals and the non-durability of some chemical
components.
Information asymmetries in this market stem from the wholesaler’s bargaining power and
substantial production lead-times at the manufacturers which can amount to two years (Shah,
2004). While production needs to be initiated well in advance of the desired selling season, the
wholesaler cannot be forced to commit to order quantities at this early stage. Final orders are
typically released close to the selling season when (weather-dependent) demand can be predicted
sufficiently well. In essence, production and ordering decisions are based on potentially different
information sets, and thus, vertical information asymmetries arise.
To analyze the manufacturer’s (wholesaler’s) optimal production (stocking) quantities, we
consider a supply chain in which potentially multiple manufacturers sell partially substitutable
products for a single season through a monopolistic wholesaler. We focus on a single period set-
ting because (i) it yields a very good approximation of the agrochemical market where the selling
season is finite and some chemical components cannot be stored until the next season; and (ii) it
is a necessary first step in the analysis of substitution effects within supply chains which is in line
2
with the existing literature. To capture the effects of upstream competition, we compare two
distinct supply chain scenarios: a horizontally integrated (hereafter ’non-competitive’) supply
chain with a single manufacturer producing all available products; and a horizontally compet-
itive (hereafter ’competitive’) supply chain with multiple manufacturers, each producing only
one product. While inspired by the agrochemical market, our framework generally suits indus-
tries in which (1) products are partial substitutes, (2) products and market structures exhibit
typical newsvendor characteristics, and (3) customers are served by a monopolistic wholesaler.
Our work contributes to the literature on (i) vertical information asymmetries in supply
chains; and, most importantly, (ii) optimal stocking levels under customer substitution. In-
formation sharing within supply chains has been a prevalent research area in the last decades
(Li, 2002; O¨zer and Wei, 2006). Apart from the issue of truthful information sharing, litera-
ture also investigates the effects that asymmetric information exert on operational problems.
In the presence of short capacity at the manufacturer, Cachon and Lariviere (1999) show that
wholesalers exploit their informational advantage by manipulating the manufacturer’s alloca-
tion mechanism. Under asymmetric information, Corbett (2001) depicts that the introduction
of consignment stocks at the wholesaler leads to reduced cycle stocks at the expense of increased
safety stocks. If wholesalers are allowed to share inventories, Yan and Zhao (2011) conclude
that wholesalers share demand information with each other, but not with the manufacturer. We
depart from this stream by incorporating an asymmetric information structure into a supply
chain prone to customer substitution.
There has been an extensive literature on the repercussions of customer substitution on
the wholesaler’s optimal stocking quantities. As common building block, the single-stage
newsvendor inventory (competition) model with stock-out-based substitution as pioneered by
McGillivray and Silver (1978), Parlar (1988), Lippman and McCardle (1997), Bassok et al.
(1999), Smith and Agrawal (2000), and Netessine and Rudi (2003) has evolved. In a seminal
paper, Netessine and Rudi (2003) extend the preceding work by characterizing the structure
of the optimal stocking levels for an arbitrary number of products under both centralization
and competition. Based on these results, recent work has investigated various competitive en-
vironments under customer substitution. Mishra and Raghunathan (2004), Kraiselburd et al.
(2004), and Kim (2008) explore the consequences of introducing Vendor Managed Inventory for
the wholesaler’s stocking levels and advertisement efforts. Nagarajan and Rajagopalan (2008)
embed the substitution framework into a multi-period setting and Jiang et al. (2011) provide
a robust optimization approach that determines stocking levels by minimizing absolute regret.
Recently, Vulcano et al. (2012) develop an efficient procedure to empirically estimate required
substitution parameters.
As common in the newsvendor framework, existing models assume that the wholesaler is
unconstrained in his stocking decision, i.e., any arbitrary amount of products can be ordered.
Being true in a single-stage setting, this assumption fails to hold in a supply chain setting.
Here, a manufacturer’s production or capacity decision constitutes a natural upper bound on
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the wholesaler’s decision space (compare this to the literature on capacity choice, e.g., Cachon
and Lariviere, 1999; Montez, 2007). By explicitly integrating these dependencies into our model
we make a two-fold contribution: first, we investigate a constrained wholesaler’s behavior; sec-
ond, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine how customer substitution affects
upstream stages. To be specific, the contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) We derive
the optimal stocking quantities of a constrained wholesaler and characterize the non-monotonic
effects that a change in a manufacturer’s production quantity exerts on optimal stocking lev-
els. (2) We formally analyze the influence of changing substitution rates on the wholesaler’s
stocking quantities. In contrast to an intuitive conjecture of Netessine and Rudi (2003), we
show that stocking levels for certain products may increase even if customer substitution away
from these products increases. (3) We characterize the optimal production quantities of an
incompletely informed manufacturer both under centralization and competition by applying a
Bayesian (Nash-)Stackelberg game. (4) We explicitly compare optimal production levels under
competition and centralization and find that competition may lead to reduced production. (5)
We show that for some products, end-of-season inventories at the manufacturer may decrease
even when initial production levels are increased under competition.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The structure of the supply chain
under consideration and the distribution of information are described in §2. Furthermore, we
elaborate on the properties of the resulting supply chain game. In §3, we present our model of
a constrained wholesaler and derive the optimal stocking quantities. We proceed by analyzing
the effects of changing substitution rates on these optimal stocking levels. The manufacturer’s
production quantities are the focus of §4. We first characterize the equilibrium production quan-
tities of a manufacturer under competition, before investigating the structure of a monopolistic
manufacturer’s optimal production quantities. We then compare production levels under cen-
tralization and competition, and examine the manufacturer’s end-of-season inventories under
both scenarios. Section 5 provides a discussion of our results and concluding remarks.
2 Supply Chain Structure and Information Distribution
We consider a two-stage supply chain with possibly multiple manufacturers (she) and a single
wholesaler (he) selling N ≥ 2 partially substitutable products for one period. While competition
among manufacturers at the upstream stage may arise, we restrict attention to a monopolistic
downstream wholesaler. In the non-competitive situation, a single manufacturer provides all
N products (bilateral monopoly), whereas in the competitive scenario, N independent manu-
facturers each produce a different product (unilateral monopoly with upstream competition).
Figure 1 illustrates both supply chain structures. In the agrochemical market, a centralized
manufacturer occurs whenever a family of patents that allows for the provision of different,
yet substitutable products is exclusively held by a single firm. In contrast, upstream competi-
tion is introduced if different manufacturers hold different patents for similar, but not identical
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Figure 1: Bilateral monopoly (left) and unilateral monopoly with upstream competition (right).
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products or if patents run out.
We assume that information is asymmetrically distributed between manufacturers and the
wholesaler. As mentioned earlier, this vertical information asymmetry between supply chain
stages arises naturally in the agrochemical market due to the wholesaler’s bargaining power and
manufacturers’ lead-times. Besides such natural causes for differing information sets, literature
has also identified many other reasons including technological issues (Lee and Whang, 2000)
and the fear of information leakage (Anand and Goyal, 2009). Our modeling approach allows
for the inclusion of any such cause for information asymmetries within the supply chain.
To be precise, in line with the literature on vertical information asymmetries, e.g., Li (2002),
O¨zer and Wei (2006) and Yan and Zhao (2011), we assume that manufacturers are incompletely
informed about the wholesaler’s optimal stocking quantities. In contrast, upstream information
are common knowledge across manufacturers, i.e., no horizontal information asymmetry arises,
and production quantities are commonly verifiable. This assumption is reasonable in the agro-
chemical market since manufacturers produce substitutable, hence comparable products and
thus, they are able to credibly estimate their competitors’ cost structures. Furthermore, to
analyze the change in production quantities under competitive effects, we need to ensure that
decisions are based on identical information sets under both supply chain structures. Follow-
ing the argument of Harsanyi (1968) and Myerson (2004), we assume that manufacturers hold
a common prior belief about the wholesaler’s optimal stocking levels. Hence, manufacturers’
beliefs are consistent. This prior belief represents the manufacturers’ perception about the col-
lection of information that are not common knowledge. In summary, supply chain structure
and information distribution imply a Bayesian (Nash-)Stackelberg Game as first introduced by
Gal-Or (1987). The for our work relevant case of multiple-leader Stackelberg games has first
been studied by Sherali (1984) and recently by DeMiguel and Xu (2009), but only for complete,
non-Bayesian information structures.
The sequence of events is as follows: In the first stage, manufacturers maximize expected
profits and determine their optimal production quantities based on their beliefs about the
wholesaler’s subsequent stocking quantities. In the second stage, before the start of the selling
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Figure 2: Sequence of Events.
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season, the wholesaler learns these production quantities and, given his private information,
derives his optimal stocking levels by maximizing expected profits. Afterwards, orders are
submitted and shipped before the selling season starts. Throughout the selling season the
wholesaler experiences customer demand and realizes profits. We refer to the subgame with
given production quantities as the Ordering Game, while the entire game is denoted as the
Supply Game. Hence, production quantities are exogenously given in the Ordering Game,
whereas they are decision variables in the Supply Game. Figure 2 summarizes the chronology.
We assume that stochastic customer demand appears exclusively at the wholesaler and no
manufacturer can pursue a direct selling strategy. Prices are exogenously given by the market
and neither player can negotiate on the price to pay. Furthermore, we restrict attention to
pure-strategy equilibria.
3 The Ordering Game
Focusing on the Stackelberg follower in this section, we derive the wholesaler’s optimal stocking
levels given the manufacturers’ production quantities and characterize its sensitivity with respect
to (i) changes in a manufacturer’s production quantity, and (ii) substitution effects.
3.1 Optimal Stocking Quantities
For each product i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the wholesaler pays a unit wholesale price wi to the manufac-
turer and sells the product at a unit retail price ri, satisfying ri > wi > 0. Additionally, the
wholesaler incurs a unit holding or disposal cost of hi ≥ 0 for each unsold item. Total demand
occurrence follows the standard model of stock-out-based substitution processes as defined by
Netessine and Rudi (2003), Ko¨k et al. (2009), and Jiang et al. (2011). Customers arrive at
the wholesaler with an initial product preference. Thus, the wholesaler faces random initial
demand for product i given by Di, which is assumed to have a continuous demand distribu-
tion with positive support. Second choice (substitution) demand stems from customers whose
initially preferred product is out of stock. If a stock-out of product i occurs, an exogenously
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given fraction αij of unserved customers is willing to substitute from product i to j; naturally∑
j 6=i αij ≤ 1 for all i. Each initially unserved customer makes at most one substitution attempt,
which, if again unserved, results in a lost sale. Total demand for product i after substitution
is denoted by Dsi = Di +
∑
j 6=i αji max{0, Dj − xj}, where xj is the wholesaler’s stocking level
for product j. For future reference, denote by x−j the (N − 1)-dimensional vector of stocking
levels for all products i 6= j.
Let x be the vector of stocking levels and ΠW (x) be the wholesaler’s expected profit when
choosing x. Since the vector of production quantities y is common knowledge and verifiable,
the wholesaler faces an optimization problem under complete information. Thus, he determines
his optimal stocking quantities by solving the following maximization problem Py:
max
0≤x≤y
ΠW (x) = E
[∑
i
ri min{xi, Dsi } − wixi − hi max{xi −Dsi , 0}
]
= E
[∑
i
uixi − (ui + oi) max{xi −Dsi , 0}
]
, (1)
where ui = ri−wi and oi = hi+wi are the wholesaler’s underage and overage costs, respectively.
The wholesaler’s objective is to maximize his expected profit under the quantity restrictions
imposed by the manufacturers’ production quantities y. If there are no such restrictions, we let
y = ∞ and refer to this case as the unconstrained problem P∞. We start our analysis of the
optimal stocking quantities with a brief discussion on the properties of ΠW (x). All proofs are
in the appendix.
Lemma 1. For arbitrary i, ΠW (x) is not concave in xi, in general, for given x−i.
Lemma 1 formalizes the numerical results in Netessine and Rudi (2003) that ΠW (x) is
not always concave in each individual stocking level xi. This also implies that ΠW (x) is not
necessarily jointly concave in x, either. Thus, there may exist multiple local optima.
For the unconstrained problem P∞, we know from Proposition 1 in Netessine and Rudi
(2003) that the optimal stocking quantities xˆ must simultaneously satisfy the following first-
order necessary optimality conditions for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}:
P(Di < xˆi)− P(Di < xˆi < Dsi ) +
∑
j 6=i
αij
uj + oj
ui + oi
P(Dsj < xˆj , Di > xˆi) =
ui
ui + oi
. (2)
In the remainder, denote by xˆi(x−i) the solution to product i’s optimality condition (2)
for given fixed values of x−i. Analogously, let xˆ−i(xi) be the solution vector of the remaining
(N −1) optimality conditions in (2) for products j 6= i if xi is fixed. We further refer to product
j’s entry in xˆ−i(xi) as xˆj(xi). By Lemma 1, it is not ensured that xˆi(x−i) is unique. Therefore,
for a given problem instance Py, we define xˆi(x−i) to be the largest solution that is feasible in
Py and for simplicity, we let xˆi(x−i) ≡ ∞ if there exists no feasible solution. The introduction
of this tie-breaking rule ensures uniqueness of xˆi(x−i) and helps us to avoid ambiguities when
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comparing two scenarios with multiple optima.
The interpretation of (2) is appealing. It is a standard newsvendor fractile solution, adjusted
by substitution effects. The second term on the left hand side increases the optimal stocking
level to account for additional second choice demand, whereas the third term reduces the optimal
stocking level by considering that a stock-out need not result in a lost sale.
The optimal solution of the constrained problem Py follows a similar pattern. Whenever
feasible, the wholesaler tries to stock the quantity that solves (2), given the other products’
optimal stocking levels. If this is not possible, he procures the entire available production
quantity yi. Proposition 1 formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 1. Denote the vector of the wholesaler’s optimal stocking quantities for the con-
strained problem Py by x
?(y). Further, refer to x?(y) as a partially largest optimal solution if
there exists no other optimal solution x′?(y) with x?−i(y) = x
′?
−i(y) and x
?
i (y) < x
′?
i (y) for any i.
Then, any partially largest optimal solution simultaneously satisfies
x?i (y) = min{xˆi(x?−i(y)), yi}, (3)
for all i = 1, . . . , N .
In the remainder, we explicitly restrict our analysis to partially largest optimal solutions.
Thus, from now on, x?(y) refers only to partially largest optimal solutions. Analogously to
our tie-breaking rule for xˆi(x−i), we employ this selection criterion to avoid ambiguities and to
enhance the expositional clarity of our analysis. Obviously, each optimization problem Py has
at least one partially largest optimal solution. In contrast, our numerical experiments indicate
that optimal solutions that are not partially largest occur very rarely. Moreover, we emphasize
that most of our subsequent results also hold for optimal solutions that are not partially largest.
Note that x?(∞) = xˆ. Therefore, the optimal stocking quantities given in (3) are consistent
with the solution to the unconstrained problem P∞ given in Netessine and Rudi (2003). Further-
more, in any Bayesian (Nash-)Stackelberg equilibrium, the wholesaler plays his best-response
against the manufacturers’ initial decision y, which is given by x?(y).
We now investigate the sensitivity of the wholesaler’s optimal stocking quantities with
respect to changes in a manufacturer’s production quantity. In particular, we are interested
in the question if the wholesaler’s optimal reaction to changes in y is monotonic. From a
manufacturer’s perspective, when altering yi, monotonicity of the wholesaler’s best-response
function at least guarantees predictability of the direction of change of x?(y), even in the
asymmetric information case. In contrast, under information asymmetries, a non-monotonic
best-response function is much harder to predict. We start our analysis by exogenously forcing
one stocking level to increase in the unconstrained problem P∞.
Lemma 2. Let ε > 0 and denote by ei the unit vector for product i.
(i) For given x−i and x′−i = x−i + εej with j 6= i, xˆi(x−i) ≥ xˆi(x′−i).
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(ii) For given xj and x
′
j = xj + ε, there are instances of P∞ for which xˆi(xj) < xˆi(x
′
j) for
some i 6= j.
Using the results of Lemma 2, we can now endogenize the increasing stocking level by
explicitly considering changes in a manufacturer’s production quantity yj . This is done in the
first part of Proposition 2. Building on this result, the second and third part transfer the
findings of Lemma 2 to the solution of the constrained problem Py.
Proposition 2. Let y′ = y + εej, ε > 0, for arbitrary j. Then:
(i) x?j (y
′) ≥ x?j (y).
(ii) For arbitrary i and j, fix x?k for all k 6= i, j and solve (3) for i and j. Then, there
always exists one optimal solution for which x?i (y
′) ≤ x?i (y).
(iii) Solve (3) for k = 1, . . . , N . There are instances of Py for which x
?
i (y
′) > x?i (y) for
some i 6= j.
In essence, Proposition 2 highlights that the wholesaler’s best-response is not necessarily
monotonic in a manufacturer’s production decision. The reason for this is the multidimension-
ality of substitution which comprises of direct and indirect effects. If the available production
quantity for one product j is increased, (i) and (ii) indicate that the wholesaler increases his
stocks for product j and, considered in isolation, reduces any other stock i 6= j. This is the
direct effect which is in line with our common understanding of economic substitutes. How-
ever, each increase or decrease in any one product’s stocking quantity has immediate effects
on all other products’ optimal stocking levels. Hence, if the wholesaler optimizes his stocking
quantities across all products, a cascade of indirect effects arises due to all products’ mutual in-
terdependency. We find that in some situations these indirect effects dominate the direct effects
so that, in optimum, the wholesaler may increase stocking levels for more than one product (iii).
Indirect effects are dominant if, e.g., the market’s substitution structure is heterogeneous in the
sense that there is few direct substitution between products j and i, but frequent substitution
between products j and k, and k and i.
3.2 Substitution Effects
We now investigate the sensitivity of the wholesaler’s optimal stocking quantities and expected
profit with respect to changing substitution rates. A change in the customers’ reaction to
product stock-outs implies changing substitution rates. Naturally, this also affects the total
demand for the wholesaler’s products. To be specific, increasing substitution rates imply a
stochastically larger total demand at the wholesaler, or mathematically, Dsi is stochastically
increasing in αji for all j 6= i. Intuition suggests that this increased demand is always beneficial
for the wholesaler since the probability of incurring lost sales decreases. Moreover, Netessine and
Rudi (2003) conjecture intuitively that optimal stocking levels for a product increase (decrease)
if substitution rates to (from) this product increase. We now test this intuition.
9
We start our analysis with the sensitivity of the wholesaler’s expected profit. As already
argued, demand is stochastically increasing in any substitution rate. Furthermore, it is well
known that, on expectation, a wholesaler benefits from increased demand if trade is profitable
(Li, 1992). Accordingly, the wholesaler’s expected profit increases in any substitution rate. The
following proposition formally states this argument.
Proposition 3. Suppose
∑
i 6=j αji < 1. The wholesaler’s expected profit ΠW (x) is increasing in
any substitution rate αji if stocking quantities x are adjusted optimally to changes in substitution
rates.
Note that Proposition 3 is true for the constrained and unconstrained problems Py and
P∞, respectively. If
∑
i 6=j αji = 1, then αji can only increase if at least one other substitution
rate αjk, k 6= i, simultaneously decreases. In this case, ΠW may actually decrease in αji.
While the sensitivity of the wholesaler’s expected profit has a monotonic behavior, we
now show that, in contrast to common intuition, his optimal stocking quantities might be non-
monotonic in substitution rates. As a starting point we analyze how xˆ changes in αji.
Lemma 3. (i) For arbitrary i, ∂xˆi/∂αji ≥ 0 for all j 6= i.
(ii) There are instances of Py for which ∂xˆj/∂αji > 0 for some i and j.
Ceteris paribus, xˆi is monotone increasing in the substitution rates to product i, αji, while
xˆj may change non-monotonically in the substitution rates from product j. Thus, Lemma 3
partially contradicts common intuition. In particular, xˆj need not decrease in αji. Thus, in
a situation where (ii) holds, it is optimal for the wholesaler to limit substitution behavior by
increasing initial stocking levels. Now, the results of Lemma 3 allow us to examine the total
effects that αji exerts on x
?.
Proposition 4. There are instances of Py for which dx
?
j/dαji > 0 for some i and j.
For the constrained optimization problem Py, Lemma 3(ii) remains valid even when includ-
ing all indirect substitution dynamics and not only direct effects. A trade-off argument between
sales volumes and product margins explains these non-intuitive results. With increased substi-
tution the wholesaler achieves a higher total sales volume, but potentially at the cost of reduced
sales for certain high margin products. (Note that the overall sales volume increases, but not
necessarily each single product’s volume.) Consider a high margin product j and a low margin
product i. To restrict substitution from product j to i, the wholesaler may raise x?j even when
αji increases. In such a situation, the wholesaler deliberately reduces his sales volume, because
this negative effect is dominated by the positive effect of more expected sales of the high margin
product. To conclude, Lemma 3 together with Proposition 4 indicate that the wholesaler’s
optimal stocking quantities are in general non-monotonic in changing substitution rates.
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4 The Supply Game
In this section, we analyze the manufacturer’s optimal production quantities under incomplete
information about the wholesaler’s stocking levels. We first focus on the competitive scenario
with multiple Stackelberg leaders and then investigate the situation with a single Stackelberg
leader. Afterwards, we compare the optimal production quantities for both scenarios and illus-
trate our findings with a numerical example.
The Ordering Game which takes production quantities y as given is the second stage of
the Supply Game. In the first stage, manufacturers choose y to maximize their expected prof-
its given their beliefs about the wholesaler’s subsequent behavior. The manufacturers’ unit
production cost and selling price for product i are ci and wi, respectively, with wi > ci > 0,
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We assume that manufacturers credibly and simultaneously announce their pro-
duction quantities yi. Further, yi ∈ [0,K], with K sufficiently large so that it never constrains
any manufacturer. Since the wholesaler has private information on his optimal stocking quan-
tities, manufacturers can only hold a belief about the wholesaler’s equilibrium stocking levels.
We explicitly model this uncertainty about the wholesaler’s orders as a random variable which
depends on the chosen production quantities y. To be specific, let χi ∈ Xi(y) with cumulative
distribution Φi(χi, y) and density φi(χi, y) > 0. We assume Φi(χi, y) to be twice continuously
differentiable in all arguments y and define µi(y) ≡
∫
Xi(y)
χidΦi(χi, y). We restrict attention to
rational beliefs.
Definition 1. We say that a manufacturer’s belief about the wholesaler’s stocking quantities is
rational if it satisfies the following conditions for all products i:
1. Xi(y) = [0, yi];
2. ∂2Φi(χi, y)/∂yi∂yj ≥ 0, j 6= i;
3. ∂Φi(χi, y)/∂yi ≤ 0 and ∂2Φi(χi, y)/∂y2i ≥ 0.
Definition 1 ensures three structural properties of a manufacturer’s belief. First, man-
ufacturers assign a positive probability mass only to non-negative stocking levels which are
naturally bounded from above by the chosen production quantity yi. Second, ceteris paribus,
manufacturers consider all products to be economic substitutes. Third, production quantities
exert a stimulating effect on the wholesaler’s stocking decision, i.e. stocking levels stochasti-
cally increase with the available production quantities, but at a decreasing rate (for a thorough
discussion on stimulating effects of inventories, see Balakrishnan et al., 2008).
We emphasize that Definition 1 imposes very mild restrictions on a manufacturer’s belief.
The wholesaler, by construction, never orders more than y. Therefore, the first property is
in line with the results of Proposition 1. The second property ensures that manufacturers
correctly believe that they compete in a substitution market. Finally, the third property follows
immediately from Proposition 2(i) which states that x?i (y) increases in yi. Irrespective of the
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kind of information asymmetries, any rational manufacturer can always predict these properties,
only the magnitude of these effects may be unknown to her. Note that we neither require beliefs
to be correct on expectation, nor do we make any assumption on how the belief for product i
changes with yj , since Propositions 2(ii) and (iii) indicate that x
?
i (y) can increase or decrease
in yj .
The manufacturer’s decision problem structurally differs in two ways from the wholesaler’s
optimization problem. First, the wholesaler’s reaction to limited production quantities is fun-
damentally different from the customers’ reaction to stock-outs. While customers only try to
substitute once with a given probability, the wholesaler’s reaction to short production capacities
is based on a non-monotonic optimization strategy across all products. Second, the manufac-
turer can influence the wholesaler’s stocking quantity for product i by changing yi, whereas the
wholesaler cannot influence customer demand for product i by varying xi.
4.1 Competing Manufacturers
We now establish the equilibrium of the first stage of the Supply Game when there are N
competing manufacturers, each selling a different, yet partially substitutable product through
a monopolistic wholesaler. Before the wholesaler communicates his stocking quantities, man-
ufacturers simultaneously choose their production levels. Accordingly, manufacturers act as
Bayesian Stackelberg leaders with respect to the wholesaler, but as Nash competitors with re-
spect to other manufacturers. Thus, each manufacturer maximizes her expected profit, given the
other manufacturers’ production quantities and given her rational beliefs about the wholesaler’s
subsequent reaction. Her decision problem for given y−i is
max
yi≥0
ΠMi(yi|y−i) = wiµi(y)− ciyi, (4)
where ΠMi(yi|y−i) is the ith manufacturer’s expected profit. For brevity, let ΠMi = ΠMi(yi|y−i)
and denote by yci = arg maxyi≥0 ΠMi the ith manufacturer’s best-response to her competitors’
production quantities y−i.
We start our equilibrium analysis by noting that rational beliefs are sufficient to guarantee
concavity of each manufacturer’s expected profit.
Lemma 4. Assume rational beliefs. Given y−i, ΠMi is a concave function of the production
quantity yi for all i.
Due to the concavity of ΠMi we can derive each manufacturer’s best-response y
c
i by exam-
ining the first-order conditions which provide necessary and sufficient optimality conditions.
Proposition 5. Assume rational beliefs. The following system of necessary first-order optimal-
ity conditions characterizes any manufacturer Nash equilibrium:
∂µi(y)
∂yi
∣∣∣∣
y=yc
=
ci
wi
, (5)
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i = 1, . . . , N.
A simple trade-off argument explains the optimality conditions (5). On expectation, in-
creasing the production level raises the wholesaler’s stocking level. This generates a marginal
increase in revenue given by wi∂µi(y)/∂yi, while simultaneously inducing a marginal cost of ci.
Equating marginal revenue and marginal costs provides the desired result. Note that yci consti-
tutes an upper bound on the wholesaler’s decision space. Hence, in any case, the wholesaler’s
stocking level is smaller than yci .
Naturally, (5) not only determines each manufacturer’s best-response in the manufacturer
Nash game, i.e. in the competition among leaders, but also persists in the entire Bayesian Nash-
Stackelberg game. Here, any Bayesian Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium is given by the wholesaler’s
optimal stocking levels x?(yc) and the manufacturers’ production quantities yc which form a
Nash equilibrium in the manufacturer Nash game. In a next step, we establish existence and
uniqueness of the manufacturer Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 6. Assume rational beliefs. For the competitive scenario, a pure-strategy manu-
facturer Nash equilibrium exists and is found by solving (5). If ΠMi is strictly concave in yi
and
2 +
∑
j 6=i
∂yci
∂yj
−
∑
j 6=i
∂2µj(y)/∂yi∂yj
∂2µi(y)/∂y2i
> 0, (6)
i = 1, . . . , N , for all y, then the manufacturer Nash equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 6 states two sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the manufacturer Nash
equilibrium. Each manufacturer’s expected profit ΠMi is strictly concave in yi if and only if
each manufacturer’s belief satisfies ∂2Φi(χi, y)/∂y
2
i > 0. Further note that a necessary condition
for (6) to hold is given by
∑
j 6=i |∂yci /∂yj | < 2. Intuitively, the sensitivity of each manufacturer’s
best-response with respect to the other manufacturers’ production decisions should be bounded.
A special case where (6) is automatically satisfied occurs if the effects of yi and y−i on µi(y)
are additive separable, i.e. µi(y) = gi(yi) + hi(y−i) for arbitrary differentiable functions gi and
hi. If gi is furthermore strictly concave, then the manufacturer Nash equilibrium is unique.
While Proposition 6 ensures uniqueness of the manufacturer Nash equilibrium, the stated
conditions are not sufficient to generally guarantee uniqueness of the Bayesian Nash-Stackelberg
equilibrium. As discussed in §3, the wholesaler’s optimal stocking levels given the manufacturers’
production quantities are not necessarily unique. Consequently, the wholesaler might have
multiple best-responses. Accordingly, to gain a unique equilibrium in the Supply Game, the
wholesaler’s optimal stocking quantities must be unique. Corollary 1 states a simple condition
that guarantees uniqueness.
Corollary 1. Let the conditions of Proposition 6 hold. Suppose ΠW (x) is jointly concave in x.
Then, the Supply Game has a unique Bayesian Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium in the competitive
scenario.
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4.2 Monopolistic Manufacturer
As a benchmark, we now derive the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium of the Supply Game
without manufacturer competition. To be specific, a monopolistic manufacturer simultane-
ously produces all N substitutable products and sells them through a monopolistic wholesaler.
Therefore, the manufacturer serves as Bayesian Stackelberg leader with respect to the whole-
saler. Thus, she maximizes her expected profit ΠM across all products given her belief about
the wholesaler’s subsequent stocking levels. Her decision problem is
max
y≥0
ΠM (y) =
∑
i
wiµi(y)− ciyi. (7)
For given rational beliefs, denote by ync = arg maxy≥0 ΠM a vector of optimal production
quantities. In contrast to the competitive scenario, the manufacturer’s expected profit ΠM is
not generally concave in y. Thus, first-order optimality conditions provide only necessary, but
not sufficient conditions for the manufacturer’s optimal production quantities.
Proposition 7. Assume rational beliefs. In any Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium of the non-
competitive scenario, the manufacturer’s production quantities satisfy the system of first-order
necessary optimality conditions
∂µi(y)
∂yi
+
∑
j 6=i
wj
wi
∂µj(y)
∂yi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
y=ync
=
ci
wi
, (8)
i = 1, . . . , N .
Analogously to the optimality conditions of the competitive scenario, the monopolistic
manufacturer’s optimal decision also follows a trade-off argument. Again, the manufacturer
equates marginal costs and marginal revenues. This time, the shift in revenue accounts not only
for the increased revenue for product i, but also for the decreased revenue for all other products
j 6= i. Intuitively, the monopolistic manufacturer considers the influence of her production
quantities on the revenue for all products, whereas each competitive manufacturer only cares
about her own product.
Neither the manufacturer’s optimal production quantities ync nor the wholesaler’s optimal
stocking levels x?(ync) are necessarily unique. In consequence, the Bayesian Stackelberg equilib-
rium of the Supply Game is not guaranteed to be unique. A sufficient condition for uniqueness
is given in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. Suppose ΠW (x) and ΠM (y) are jointly concave in x and y, respectively. Then,
the Supply Game has a unique Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium in the non-competitive scenario.
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4.3 The Consequences of Manufacturer Competition
Intuitively, competing manufacturers adopt production quantities yc that differ substantially
from a monopolistic manufacturer’s production quantities ync even though they may hold iden-
tical beliefs about the wholesaler’s subsequent stocking levels. In this context, the natural
question arises whether competition causes manufacturers to increase production quantities,
i.e., yc > ync? Furthermore, vertical information asymmetries induce supply chain inefficien-
cies that manifest in end-of-season inventories at the manufacturer. However, are these effects
smaller or larger under upstream competition? We now explore these issues.
Intuition suggests that the wholesaler prefers competing manufacturers to a monopolistic
manufacturer because we expect production quantities to increase under competition. Hence,
the wholesaler’s decision space is less restricted under manufacturer competition and so, he can
provide a more profitable service level to his customers. Proposition 8 shows that this intuition
is not always true.
Proposition 8. For given rational beliefs, the relationship between yc and ync is as follows:
(i) If
∑
j 6=i
wj
∂µj(y)
∂yi
≤ 0 (9)
for all products i, then yci ≥ ynci for at least one product i.
(ii) There are rational beliefs such that yci < y
nc
i for some product i.
It can never happen that all production quantities decrease under competition, if (9) holds.
This condition ensures that each product has in total a negative effect on the other products,
which is the nature of substitute products. A sufficient condition for (9) are rational beliefs that
additionally satisfy ∂Φi(χi, y)/∂yj ≥ 0 for all j 6= i, or intuitively, each product j should exert
a negative influence on every other product i. Note that Proposition 2(iii) indicates that this
need not be true for all products. There exist situations where two products have a positive
effect on each other, i.e. ∂Φi(χi, y)/∂yj < 0 for some i and j. Condition (9) also captures these
contingencies because we only require the weighted sum over all effects to be negative, not each
single effect. We propose that any product that violates (9) is no longer an economic substitute,
but rather an economic complement for the other products.
An availability trade-off explains why a monopolistic manufacturer sometimes stocks more
than a competitive manufacturer (ii). A monopolistic manufacturer can coordinate the availabil-
ity of all products, i.e. she can optimally build large stocks of a product i, while simultaneously
decreasing the availability for products j 6= i. Under competition, a manufacturer cannot ac-
complish this availability trade-off since she cannot force her competitors to reduce production
quantities. This contingency occurs for a product i if, e.g., manufacturers believe that yi ex-
erts only a limited influence on the wholesaler’s stocking decision for the other products x?−i.
Markets with such a heterogeneous substitution structure typically include no-name and brand
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products (Ailawadi and Keller, 2004) or heterogeneous products.
If the effects of yi and y−i on µi(y) are additive separable for all i, or if (9) holds and all
products are homogeneous and symmetric, then production increases under competition for all
products, i.e. yc ≥ ync.
Note that the results of Proposition 8 are similar to the findings of Netessine and Rudi
(2003) for competition among wholesalers. However, these two results are based on different
problem characteristics because the wholesaler’s and manufacturer’s problem differ structurally
in numerous ways. In particular, substitution dynamics and demand characteristics are com-
pletely different. Therefore, Proposition 8 establishes the transferability of the previous results
to the manufacturer stage.
Naturally, as manufacturers’ production quantities change under competition, the whole-
saler also adjusts his stocking quantities. This implies that end-of-season inventories at the
manufacturer, i.e., excess inventories after trading, change if competition is introduced. Note
that these residual inventories are a direct consequence of the vertical information asymmetry
within the supply chain. If manufacturers could perfectly determine the wholesaler’s best-
response stocking quantities, they would never produce more than this quantity. Accordingly,
manufacturers would never incur end-of-season inventories. Therefore, we now examine the
change in manufacturers’ end-of-season inventories under competition in the case of informa-
tion asymmetries. We denote the end-of-season inventory level of product i at the manufacturer
by Ii(y) = yi − x?i (y).
Proposition 9. Let y′ ≥ y. Then, the following relations between I(y′) and I(y) hold:
(i) Ii(y
′) ≥ Ii(y) for at least one product i.
(ii) There are instances of the Supply Game where Ii(y
′) < Ii(y) for some product i.
The wholesaler is always less restricted in his decision under y′ than under y. This reflects,
e.g., a situation where all production quantities increase under upstream competition. Even
though all production quantities (weakly) increase, end-of-season inventories for some (ii), but
not all (i) products may decrease. In such a case, the wholesaler increases his stocking quantity
for product i more than the manufacturer increases yi. This behavior is closely related to the
findings of Proposition 2. Thus, indirect substitution dynamics at the wholesaler can lead to
such a disproportionate adjustment of stocking levels.
4.4 Numerical Illustration
We now provide a small numerical example to illustrate our theoretical findings. Consider
a market with three substitutable products. For the sake of analytical tractability, suppose
that each manufacturer believes that the wholesaler’s stocking quantities follow a truncated
exponential distribution with support on [0, yi] and rate parameter λi(y), i.e. Φi(χi, y) =
[1 − exp(−λi(y)χi)]/[1 − exp(−λi(y)yi)]. Note that our framework also works for any other
common distribution such as truncated Normal, Gamma, or Weibull distributions, but at the
cost of analytical tractability.
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Parameters Optimal decision
Scenario w1 w2 w3 k21 k31 k12 k32 k13 k23 y
c
1 y
c
2 y
c
3 y
nc
1 y
nc
2 y
nc
3
A 8 8 8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.61 0.61 0.61
B 8 8 8 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.20 0.63 0.63 1.00 0.60 0.60
C 8 8 8 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.65 0.84 0.84 0.71 0.69 0.69
D 8 8 8 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 1.20 0.75 0.75 0.81 0.85 0.85
E 10 8 8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.00 0.66 0.66 1.07 0.45 0.45
F 11.9 8 8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.24 0.62 0.62 1.89 0.06 0.06
G 11.9 10 7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.20 0.91 0.44 1.44 0.59 0.05
Table 1: Optimal production decisions.
Following Definition 1, beliefs about the wholesaler’s stocking level for product i should
be stochastically increasing in yi. Thus, each rate parameter λi(y) is a function of the manu-
facturers’ production quantities which decreases in yi. To be specific, we employ the following
simple structural form: λi(y) = y
−1
i +
∑
j 6=i kjiyj + 1. By setting kji ≥ 0 we ensure that the
other requirements of Definition 1 are met. We work with the inverse of yi and not with −yi to
ensure non-negativity of λi(y). Intuitively, each scale parameter kji reflects the magnitude of
influence that yj exerts on the wholesaler’s stocking decision for product i.
The truncated exponential distribution together with the specification of λi(y) ensures that
each manufacturer holds rational beliefs as described in Definition 1. It is readily shown that
µi(y) = [1/λi(y)] − [yiexp(−λi(y)yi)/(1 − exp(−λi(y)yi))]. Thus, the influence of yi and y−i
on µi(y) is not additive separable. For all investigated scenarios, we assume ci = 2 for all
i. All other parameter values wi and kji are given in Table 1. Parameters include high and
low margin cases, and high and low substitution rates. Note that for all displayed parameter
values, a unique Bayesian (Nash-)Stackelberg equilibrium exists. For each scenario, we display
the optimal production decisions for both supply chain configurations.
Obviously, in a market with symmetric price and substitution structure, production quanti-
ties increase if manufacturer competition is introduced (A). In our example, this result remains
valid if there is no substitution to one product in the assortment (B). If instead one product
does not influence the other products, i.e., there is no substitution away from the product,
then production levels decrease for this product under competition (C,D). In such a scenario, a
monopolistic manufacturer optimally increases the availability of the product at the cost of de-
creasing the other products’ availability. In a competitive environment, a manufacturer cannot
coordinate product availability across multiple products because her competitors are reluctant
to lose market shares. In the agrochemical market, these heterogeneous substitution structures
arise due to the coexistence of single- and multi-purpose products. While single-purpose prod-
ucts are specialized to fight a single plant disease such as mildew, multi-purpose products are
effective against a wider class of diseases. Naturally, substitution from the specialized to the
more general product is likely to occur, because the specialized product lies within the applica-
tion range of the general product. In contrast, the specialized product need not be useful for a
customer initially desiring the general product.
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In our example, production quantities for high margin products decrease under competi-
tion, while production increases for low and medium margin products (E,F,G). We observe this
behavior because a monopolistic manufacturer shifts as much demand as possible to the high
margin products, thereby reducing the other products’ availability to a minimum. In contrast,
a similar demand shift cannot be accomplished under competition. Note that under a monopo-
listic manufacturer, low margin products almost disappear from the market, while competition
ensures product diversity (F,G). Concurrent with intuition, overall production increases with
the introduction of manufacturer competition.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the optimal production and stocking decisions of a manufacturer and
a wholesaler in a two-stage supply chain with upstream competition and vertical information
asymmetries. We characterize the wholesaler’s equilibrium stocking levels and show that these
quantities are non-monotonic in both, available production quantities and customer substitution
rates. For the upstream stage of the supply chain, we derive the equilibrium production levels
of a monopolistic and a competitive manufacturer, respectively. We find that production levels
for some products decrease if upstream competition is introduced. Furthermore, we highlight
the counterintuitive situation that some end-of-season inventories at the manufacturer decrease
although initial production levels increase.
5.1 Robustness
We now discuss the robustness of our results with respect to changes in the information and
supply chain structure. Additionally, we delineate opportunities for future research.
Concerning the information structure, we assume that (i) manufacturers’ production quan-
tities y are verifiable, and (ii) Φi(χi, y) is differentiable in y. Verifiability of y ensures that the
wholesaler determines his stocking quantities under complete information about the manufac-
turer’s strategy. Consequently, we can ignore communication issues between manufacturer and
wholesaler. This is not true if y is unverifiable and thus privately observed by the manufacturer.
In this case, the manufacturer’s equilibrium behavior consists of her production and commu-
nication strategy, which introduces an additional inference problem for the wholesaler. Under
strategic communication, the manufacturer need not pursue a truth-telling strategy or she may
not communicate any information at all, which inherently changes the timing of the game to
simultaneous moves. Whether the structure of our results remains valid under such a scenario,
or not, is an interesting question for future research.
We further assume that a manufacturer’s belief Φi(χi, y) about the wholesaler’s optimal
stocking quantities x?i (y) is differentiable with respect to y. This is a common assumption
(Cachon and Lariviere, 1999; O¨zer and Wei, 2006), but clearly, it is not ensured that, in equilib-
rium, x?i (y) is actually differentiable. Nevertheless, it is guaranteed that x
?
i (y) is continuous in
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y. For such a situation, Cachon and Lariviere (1999) show numerically that the differentiability
assumption provides an excellent approximation. We therefore expect our results to be robust
with respect to differentiability of beliefs.
Concerning the supply chain structure, we assume that competition occurs only among
manufacturers. This assumption is inspired by our observations in the agrochemical market,
but obviously, a general extension of our framework is to allow for downstream competition as
well. Such an extension introduces two new issues that need to be incorporated into the model.
First, manufacturers need to decide on allocation mechanisms for their production quantities
in case that total orders exceed the available production quantities. Second, these allocation
schemes induce strategic ordering behavior of the wholesalers. The influence of these allocation
problems on supply chains in substitution markets should be a focal point of future work.
Additionally, under downstream competition, the assumption that Φi(χi, y) is differentiable
in y becomes much more problematic. At some point, competition among heterogeneous whole-
salers can induce some competitors to leave the market. Generally, such a market exit results
in discontinuities in the stocking quantities of the remaining competitors. Therefore, the dif-
ferentiability assumption provides a less reliable approximation. Nevertheless, we expect that
such an approximation yields structurally valid results, even under downstream competition.
To deepen our understanding of the repercussions that substitution exerts on the individual
supply chain members, more fundamental extensions should also be examined. In particular,
we believe that future models should also incorporate pricing decisions, but this might come
at the expense of analytical tractability. Another aspect that deserves future research is the
introduction of multiple time periods. In such a setting, initial product demand changes dynam-
ically over time because there is a probability of a substituting customer changing his product
preferences due to product unavailability.
5.2 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis demonstrates that substituting customers affect the production and stocking de-
cisions within a supply chain in non-monotonic and partially counterintuitive ways. Thus,
intuition may fail to capture all relevant substitution dynamics and this effect becomes stronger
the more heterogeneous the competing products are. While in completely homogeneous (sym-
metric) markets intuition correctly predicts each supply chain member’s behavior, intuitive
reasoning is prone to crucial misinterpretations as soon as the market becomes heterogeneous.
Reasons for such heterogeneities are widely spread in reality and can be found in terms of profit
margins, brands, and product and demand characteristics.
The agrochemical market, e.g., is shaped by these heterogeneities. Brand manufacturers
and (former) patent holders compete with generic products, which oftentimes differ in price
and profit margins. Furthermore, the market’s substitution structure is skewed due to the
coexistence of single- and multi-purpose products. Hence, in such a heterogeneous market, it
is very important to understand the substitution structures among products to take the right
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decisions.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. For given x−i, the first-order and second-order derivatives of ΠW (x) with
respect to xi are
∂ΠW (x)
∂xi
=ui − (ui + oi)P(Dsi < xi)−
∑
j 6=i
(uj + oj)αijP(Dsj < xj , Di > xi)
=ui − (ui + oi)P(Dsi < xi)−
∑
j 6=i
(uj + oj)αijP(Dsj < xj |Di > xi)P(Di > xi)
∂2ΠW (x)
∂x2i
=− (ui + oi)fDsi (xi)
+
∑
j 6=i
(uj + oj)αij
[
fDi(xi)P(D
s
j < xj |Di > xi)− αijfDsj |Di>xi(xj)P(Di > xi)
]
,
i = 1, . . . , N , with fY being the density function of random variable Y . By rearranging terms,
ΠW (x) is concave in xi if and only if
(ui + oi)fDsi (xi) +
∑
j 6=i
(uj + oj)α
2
ijfDsj |Di>xi(xj)P(Di > xi) ≥
∑
j 6=i
(uj + oj)αijfDi(xi)P(D
s
j < xj |Di > xi)
(10)
for all x. To prove the lemma, we construct a scenario for which (10) is violated for some x.
Let η > 0, and for given xi, let Xη(xi) be the set of stocking quantities x−i such that
P(Dsj < xj |Di > xi) ≥ 1/(N − 1) and fDsj |Di>xi(xj) < η. Note that for any xi, Xη(xi) is
non-empty because P(Dsj < xj |Di > xi)→ 1 and fDsj |Di>xi(xj)→ 0 for xj →∞. For all j 6= i,
let (i) αji = 0, i.e., D
s
i =st Di; (ii) αij = 1/(N − 1); and (iii) (uj + oj) = (1 + ν)(ui + oi)(N − 1),
ν > 0. Further assume that Di ∼ Normal(µi, σi) with σi < ν/
[
(1 + ν)η
√
2pi
]
.
Given these assumptions,
(ui + oi) [fDi(xi) + (1 + ν)η] > (ui + oi)fDsi (xi) +
∑
j 6=i
(uj + oj)α
2
ijfDsj |Di>xi(xj)P(Di > xi)
(11)
and ∑
j 6=i
(uj + oj)αijfDi(xi)P(D
s
j < xj |Di > xi) ≥ (ui + oi)(1 + ν)fDi(xi). (12)
By (10)-(12), it follows that ΠW (x) is not concave in xi, if for some xi,
(1 + ν)fDi(xi) > [fDi(xi) + (1 + ν)η] , (13)
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or equivalently,
fDi(xi) >
1 + ν
ν
η. (14)
Since Di is normally distributed, we can choose xi such that fDi(xi) = 1/(σi
√
2pi) and hence,
(14) holds for any σi < ν/
[
(1 + ν)η
√
2pi
]
.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the maximization problem Py. Since ΠW (x) and all con-
straints are continuously differentiable in x and all constraints are linear in x, there exists
a unique vector λ such that (x?, λ) satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions:
∂ΠW (x
?)
∂xi
− λi = 0 (15)
λi(x
?
i − yi) = 0 (16)
x?i − yi ≤ 0 (17)
x?, λ ≥ 0, (18)
i = 1, . . . , N . Now, suppose x? is a partially largest optimal solution.
Case 1: x?i < yi. For (16) to hold, we need λi = 0, which implies by (15) and (2) that
x?i = xˆi(x
?
−i).
Case 2: x?i = yi. We need to show that yi ≤ xˆi(x?−i). Suppose to the contrary that there
exist situations where x?i = yi > xˆi(x
?
−i). By (2), xˆi(x
?
−i) is the wholesaler’s optimal stocking
quantity if he is unrestricted in his stocking decision for product i. Now, if this stocking
quantity is also feasible for the bounded problem Py, then it must also be optimal in Py. Thus,
x?i = xˆi(x
?
−i) < yi = x
?
i which is a contradiction.
Combining Case 1 and 2 for all i yields x?i (y) = min{xˆi(x?−i(y)), yi}.
Proof of Lemma 2. Given x−i, the wholesaler’s optimization problem is now one-dimensional in
xi. Thus, to analyze how xˆi(x−i) changes in xj , j 6= i, we apply the Implicit Function Theorem
to gain the required differential
∂xˆi(x−i)
∂xj
= −∂
2ΠW (xˆi, x−i)/∂xi∂xj
∂2ΠW (xˆi, x−i)/∂x2i
.
Due to the optimality of xˆi(x−i), we know that ∂2ΠW (xˆi, x−i)/∂x2i ≤ 0. Furthermore, analysis
of the cross-partial yields
∂2ΠW (xˆi, x−i)
∂xi∂xj
= −(ui + oi) ∂
∂xj
P(Dsi < xˆi)−
∑
k 6=i
(uk + ok)αik
∂
∂xj
P(Dsk < xk|Di > xˆi)P(Di > xi).
By construction, Dsk, k 6= j, is stochastically decreasing in xj and so, ∂P(Dsi < xˆi)/∂xj ≥ 0
and ∂P(Dsk < xk|Di > xˆi)/∂xj ≥ 0 for all k 6= i, j. Additionally, Dsj does not depen-
dent on xj and therefore ∂P(Dsj < xj |Di > xˆi)/∂xj ≥ 0. Combining these arguments gives
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∂2ΠW (xˆi, x−i)/∂xi∂xj ≤ 0 and finally
∂xˆi(x−i)
∂xj
≤ 0.
Thus, it follows that xˆi(x−i) ≥ xˆi(x′−i).
(ii) Consider a three-product scenario with products denoted by i, j, and k, respectively,
and suppose that the density functions of Di, Dj , and Dk are strictly positive on R+. This
implies that the inequality in Part (i) is strict because ∂2ΠW (xˆi, x−i)/∂xi∂xj < 0. Assume
αjk > 0, αki > 0, and any other substitution rate to be zero. Note that xˆi(xj) depends on xj
only indirectly through xˆk(xj). We now prove the lemma by a sequential argument.
First, we analyze the direct effects between the three products. By Part (i), x′j > xj implies
xˆk(x
′
j) < xˆk(xj), and thus xˆi(x
′
j) > xˆi(xj). Second, to complete the proof, we need to show
that an increased stocking quantity for product i also leads to a decreased stocking quantity for
k, but this is again just an application of Part (i).
Accordingly, since direct and indirect substitution effects point in the same direction, we
can conclude that xˆi(xj) < xˆi(x
′
j).
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Suppose x?j (y
′) < x?j (y). This can never happen because x
?
j (y
′) is
feasible in Py, but by assumption, it is dominated in Py by x
?
j (y). This must also be true in
Py′ because any feasible solution of Py is feasible in Py′ . Thus, x
?
j (y
′) cannot be optimal in Py′ .
This is a contradiction and therefore x?j (y
′) ≥ x?j (y).
(ii) By Part (i) and Lemma 2(i), it is always true that xˆi(x
?
j (y), x
?
−j) ≥ xˆi(x?j (y′), x?−j). It
follows immediately that x?i (y) = min{xˆi(x?j (y), x?−j), yi} ≥ min{xˆi(x?j (y′), x?−j), yi} = x?i (y′).
(iii) Assume yi large enough so that it never constrains the wholesaler. This assumption
ensures the applicability of Lemma 2 because we are guaranteed to find an interior solution
to the wholesaler’s optimization problem. Hence, by Part (i) and Lemma 2(ii), there exist
situations where xˆi(x
?
−i(y)) < xˆi(x
?
−i(y
′)) for some i 6= j. Thus,
x?i (y) = min{xˆi(x?−i(y)), yi} = xˆi(x?−i(y)) < xˆi(x?−i(y′)) = min{xˆi(x?−i(y′)), yi} = x?i (y′)
for some i 6= j.
Proof of Proposition 3. The total differential of ΠW (x) with respect to substitution rates is
dΠW (x
?(αji), αji)
dαji
=
∂ΠW
∂αji
+
∑
k
∂ΠW
∂x?k
∂x?k
∂αji
.
In a first step, we show that ∂ΠW /∂αji ≥ 0 for all i and j, i 6= j, i.e.
∂ΠW
∂αji
= (ui + oi)E
[
(Dj − xj)1{Dsi<xi,Dj>xj}
]
≥ 0. (19)
This holds true, since the term under the expectation in (19) is non-negative.
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In a second step, we investigate the indirect effects of αji on ΠW . If x is optimally adjusted,
then, for all k, ∂ΠW /∂xk = 0 if x
?
k < yk and ∂x
?
k/∂αji = 0 if x
?
k = yk. Thus, dΠW /dαji =
∂ΠW /∂αji ≥ 0 for all i and j, if x is adjusted optimally.
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Choose an arbitrary product i. Application of the Implicit Function
Theorem yields
∂xˆi(α)
∂αji
= −∂
2ΠW (xˆ(α), α)/∂xi∂αji
∂2ΠW (xˆ(α), α)/∂x2i
. (20)
Due to the optimality of xˆ(α), we know that ∂2ΠW (xˆ(α), α)/∂x
2
i ≤ 0. In addition, the cross-
partial ∂2ΠW /∂xi∂αji is explicitly given by
∂2ΠW
∂xi∂αji
= −(ui + oi) ∂
∂αji
P(Dsi < xˆi), (21)
for all j 6= i. By construction, Dsi = Di +
∑
k 6=i αki(Dk − xk)+. Thus, Dsi is stochastically
increasing in αji. It follows that ∂P(Dsi < xi)/∂αji ≤ 0, and hence, ∂2ΠW /∂xi∂αji ≥ 0. Now,
by (20) and (21), ∂xˆi/∂αji ≥ 0 for all j 6= i due to the optimality of xˆ(α).
(ii) Similar to Part (i), the proof proceeds by evaluating
∂xˆj(α)
∂αji
= −∂
2ΠW (xˆ(α), α)/∂xj∂αji
∂2ΠW (xˆ(α), α)/∂x2j
. (22)
In contrast to the proof of Part (i), the cross-partial can now be positive or negative, since
∂2ΠW
∂xj∂αji
= −(ui + oi)
[
P(Dsi < xˆi, Dj > xˆj) + αji
∂
∂αji
P(Dsi < xˆi, Dj > xˆj)
]
, (23)
where ∂P(Dsi < xˆi, Dj > xˆj)/∂αji ≤ 0.
We therefore prove the lemma by providing an example. Consider a two-product portfolio
with heterogeneous initial demands Di ∼ Uniform(0, 1) and Dj ∼ Beta(2, 1), i.e. Fj(xj) =
x2j . Assume all other parameters to be symmetric across products. To be concrete: ui =
uj = 2, oi = oj = 8, and αij = αji = 0.8. In this setting, we obtain ∂
2ΠW /∂x
2
j =
−10
[
(xi + xj)
2 + x2j/4
]
≤ 0, and ∂2ΠW /∂xj∂αji = 125x3i /24 ≥ 0. Consequently, ∂xˆj/∂αji =
25/48 · xˆ3i /
[
(xˆi + xˆj)
2 + xˆ2j/4
]
> 0 for xˆ > 0, which is satisfied because xˆ = 0 is not an optimum
since there exist stocking quantities that yield a strictly positive profit.
Proof of Proposition 4. The total differential of the optimal stocking level for product j with
respect to substitution rates is
dx?j (x
?
−j(αji), αji)
dαji
=
∂x?j
∂αji
+
∑
k 6=j
∂x?j
∂x?k
∂x?k
∂αji
.
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To prove the claim, we make use of the following two properties: For all k, (a) if x?k = yk, then
∂x?k/∂αji = 0; and (b) if x
?
k < yk, then ∂x
?
k/∂αji = ∂xˆk/∂αji. From Lemma 3(ii), for some i
and j, i 6= j, there are instances of Py where ∂xˆj/∂αji > 0. Combining this result with property
(b), we find that there are instances of Py with ∂x
?
j/∂αji > 0. Now assume that x
?
k = xˆk = yk
for all k 6= i, yielding dx?j/dαji = ∂x?j/∂αji > 0 and the proposition follows.
Proof of Lemma 4. To prove the desired result, we make use of the inverse distribution function
Φ−1i (ρi, y), ρi ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, Φi(χi, y) = ρi and Φ−1i (ρi, y) = χi. Note that the assump-
tions on rational beliefs imply ∂2Φ−1i (ρi, y)/∂y
2
i ≤ 0. Further, Φi(0, y) = 0 and Φi(yi, y) = 1.
Assuming rational beliefs and given y−i, each manufacturer’s expected profit can be written
as
ΠMi(yi|y−i) = wi
∫ yi
0
χidΦi(χi, y)− ciyi = wi
∫ yi
0
(1− Φi(χi, y))dχi − ciyi. (24)
Using the inverse distribution function, we can rewrite (24) as
ΠMi(yi|y−i) = wi
∫ 1
0
(1− ρi)dΦ−1i (ρi, y)− ciyi = wi
∫ 1
0
Φ−1i (ρi, y)dρi − ciyi.
Therefore,
∂2ΠMi(yi|y−i)
∂y2i
= wi
∫ 1
0
∂2Φ−1i (ρi, y)
∂y2i
dρi ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Assuming rational beliefs, each manufacturer’s expected profit given
her competitors’ production levels is
ΠMi(yi|y−i) = wiµi(y)− ciyi.
Taking the first-order derivative and satisfying the optimality condition yields
∂ΠMi(yi|y−i)
∂yi
= wi
∂µi(y)
∂yi
− ci = 0,
and the result follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 6. A pure-strategy manufacturer Nash equilibrium exists if (i) each manu-
facturer’s strategy space is a non-empty, compact and convex set, and (ii) each manufacturer’s
profit function ΠMi is continuous in y and quasi-concave in yi (Debreu, 1952). Lemma 4 to-
gether with our assumptions ensures that these conditions are satisfied. Thus, there exists at
least one pure-strategy manufacturer Nash equilibrium.
To derive our uniqueness conditions, we rely on the fundamental results of Rosen (1965). In
particular, Theorem 2 in Rosen (1965) asserts that the manufacturer Nash equilibrium defined
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by (5) is unique if (i) ΠMi is twice continuously differentiable in y for all i, and (ii) σ(y, δ) =∑N
i=1 δiΠMi(yi|y−i) is diagonally strictly concave for some fixed δ > 0. While condition (i) is
guaranteed by our assumptions, we need some more definitions to verify condition (ii).
Let g(y, δ) be the pseudogradient of σ(y, δ) for fixed δ, i.e.,
g(y, δ) =

δ1∂ΠM1/∂y1
...
δN∂ΠMN /∂yN
 ,
and denote by G(y, δ) the Jacobian of g(y, δ) with respect to y, i.e.,
G(y, δ) = ∇yg(y, δ) =
(
δi∂
2ΠMi/∂yi∂yj
)
ij
.
Now, Theorem 6 in Rosen (1965) states that σ(y, δ) is diagonally strictly concave if G(y, δ) is
negative definite for all y ∈ ×i[0, yi] ⊆ [0,K]N and some fixed δ > 0. Thus, the manufacturer
Nash equilibrium is unique if, for some δ > 0, G(y, δ) is negative definite for all y.
Negative definiteness of G(y, δ): Denote by GT (y, δ) the transposed of G(y, δ). A basic
result in fundamental algebra states that G(y, δ) is negative definite if its symmetric part
Gsym(y, δ) =
[
G(y, δ) +GT (y, δ)
]
/2 is negative definite. This is true if all eigenvalues of
Gsym(y, δ) are negative. Note that, due to Definition 1, all elements of Gsym(y, δ) are non-
positive. Hence, by the Gershgorin Circle Theorem (see Varga, 2004), an upper bound for the
ith eigenvalue of Gsym(y, δ) is given by
ubi = δi
∂2ΠMi
∂y2i
− 1
2
∑
j 6=i
[
δi
∂2ΠMi
∂yi∂yj
+ δj
∂2ΠMj
∂yi∂yj
]
,
i = 1, . . . , N . Therefore, Gsym(y, δ) is negative definite if, for all i, ubi < 0. This is true if ΠMi
is strictly concave in yi, and
2 +
∑
j 6=i
∂yCi
∂yj
−
∑
j 6=i
δj
δi
∂2ΠMj/∂yi∂yj
∂2ΠMi/∂y
2
i
> 0 (25)
for all y, where we make use of the Implicit Function Theorem
∂yCi
∂yj
= −∂
2ΠMi/∂yi∂yj
∂2ΠMi/∂y
2
i
.
By choosing δi = 1/wi > 0 for all i, (25) reduces to (6), which proves the proposition.
Proof of Corollary 1. If ΠW (x) is jointly concave in x, then the wholesaler’s optimal stocking
quantity x?(y) is unique for any given y. In addition, under the conditions of Proposition 6,
the manufacturer Nash equilibrium yc is unique. It follows that (x?(yc), yc) defines the unique
Bayesian Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium in the competitive scenario of the Supply Game.
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Proof of Proposition 7. Assuming rational beliefs, the manufacturer’s expected profit is
ΠM (y) =
∑
i
wiµi(y)− ciyi.
Taking first-order derivatives yields
∂ΠM (y)
∂yi
= wi
∂µi(y)
∂yi
+
∑
j 6=i
wj
∂µj(y)
∂yi
− ci,
i = 1, . . . , N . Rearranging terms and satisfying the optimality conditions gives (8).
Proof of Corollary 2. If ΠW (x) and ΠM (y) are jointly concave in x and y, respectively, then the
wholesaler’s optimal stocking quantity given y, x?(y), and the manufacturer’s optimal produc-
tion quantity ync are both unique. Thus, in the non-competitive scenario of the Supply Game,
(x?(ync), ync) defines the unique Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 8. We start this proof with a preliminary result that is useful in the re-
mainder. Let y′−i ≥ y−i and note that
∂2µi(y)
∂yi∂yj
= −
∫ yi
0
∂2Φi(χi, y)
∂yi∂yj
dχi ≤ 0
by the definition of rational beliefs. It follows that for arbitrarily fixed y˜i
∂µi(yi, y
′
−i)
∂yi
∣∣∣∣
yi=y˜i
≤ ∂µi(yi, y−i)
∂yi
∣∣∣∣
yi=y˜i
. (26)
(i) The proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume yc < ync. Now, by comparing and
equating the optimality conditions (5) and (8), we require
∂µi(yi, y
c
−i)
∂yi
∣∣∣∣
yi=yci
=
ci
wi
=
∂µi(yi, y
nc
−i)
∂yi
+
∑
j 6=i
wj
wi
∂µj(yi, y
nc
−i)
∂yi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
yi=ynci
(27)
to be true. By assumption (9), the second term on the right-hand side of (27) is always non-
positive. So, for (27) to hold, we need
∂µi(yi, y
c
−i)
∂yi
∣∣∣∣
yi=yci
≤ ∂µi(yi, y
nc
−i)
∂yi
∣∣∣∣
yi=ynci
.
By (26) and concavity of µi with respect to yi, this can only be true if y
c
i ≥ ynci , a contradiction
to our initial assumption.
(ii) An example provides the proof. Assume manufacturers’ beliefs about the wholesaler’s
stocking levels for products j 6= i are independent of the production quantity of product i, i.e.
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µj(yi, y−i) = µj(y−i) for all j 6= i. Hence, ∂µj/∂yi = 0 for all j 6= i. Assume further that
∂2Φi(χi, y)/∂yi∂yj > 0 for all j 6= i. Then, the inequality in (26) becomes strict.
Comparing the optimality conditions (5) and (8) for product i gives
∂µi(yi, y
c
−i)
∂yi
∣∣∣∣
yi=yci
=
ci
wi
=
∂µi(yi, y
nc
−i)
∂yi
∣∣∣∣
yi=ynci
. (28)
Now, assume yc−i ≥ ync−i; otherwise the proof would already be complete. By (26) and concavity
of µi with respect to yi, (28) can only be true if y
c
i < y
nc
i .
Proof of Proposition 9. (i) The proof proceeds by contradiction. Let y′ ≥ y and suppose I(y′) <
I(y). Then, for arbitrary i,
y′−i − x?−i(y′) < y−i − x?−i(y). (29)
As an immediate consequence of (29), we know that x?−i(y
′) > x?−i(y). Now, by repeatedly
applying Lemma 2(i),
xˆi(x
?
−i(y
′)) ≤ xˆi(x?−i(y)), (30)
and recall that x?i (y) = min{xˆi(x?−i(y)), yi}.
If xˆi(x
?
−i(y)) ≥ yi, then Ii(y) = yi − yi = 0, and thus Ii(y′) ≥ Ii(y). If, to the contrary,
xˆi(x
?
−i(y)) < yi, then applying (30) yields
Ii(y) = yi − xˆi(x?−i(y)) ≤ y′i − xˆi(x?−i(y′)) = Ii(y′).
Accordingly, Ii(y
′) ≥ Ii(y); a contradiction to our initial assumption that I(y′) < I(y).
(ii) The proof is an application of Proposition 2. Suppose y′ = y+ εej , ε > 0, for arbitrary
j. Then, by Proposition 2(iii), there exist situations where x?i (y
′) > x?i (y) for some i 6= j. Thus,
Ii(y
′) = y′i − x?i (y′) < y′i − x?i (y) = yi − x?i (y) = Ii(y).
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